MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm allows an authenticated user to update the authentication column (default: email) without verifying their current password. Because email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after the attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password reset from outside the system.

The password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires old password verification, so the gap is asymmetric.

The postAccountInfoForm action passes $request->validated() directly to $user->update(). The AccountInfoRequest whitelists the authentication column (email by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with ChangePasswordRequest, which uses Hash::check against the stored password before allowing any change.

Scenarios where this is exploitable include:

Fixed in #5990 — the authentication column is now protected by a current password check (mirroring ChangePasswordRequest) whenever its value changes.

A stronger mitigation — sending a verification link to the new address before persisting the change — can be layered on top using Laravel's MustVerifyEmail flow.

All versions prior to 6.8.14 / 7.0.38.