CVE-2026-79785

X-AnyLabeling's model downloader disabled TLS certificate verification. download with retry in anylabeling/services/auto labeling/model.py built a context with ssl. create unverified context() and passed it to urllib.request.urlopen, so neither the certificate chain nor the hostname was checked on any model download, and models are fetched over HTTPS from the project's release host. Any party positioned to intercept that connection could therefore answer it with content of their own choosing. The response is written to a .part file and moved into place with os.replace, and the only post-download check, safe check model, validates the file's format rather than its provenance: no hash or signature is compared against an expected value. For an ONNX target the substituted file passes onnx.checker.check model and is then used for inference, so the attacker chooses the model that produces the application's annotations. For a .pth or .pt target, which the shipped SAM2 video, YOLOE, UPN and open vision configurations use, the check worker calls torch.load without weights only, so a substituted file is unpickled and executes code of the attacker's choosing on PyTorch releases predating the weights only default.