CVE-2026-80772

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon ctlr read handler()

joycon ctlr read handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon input report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check:

if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */
	joycon parse report(ctlr, (struct joycon input report *)data);

struct joycon input report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon parse report() -> joycon parse imu report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC INPUT IMU DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller.

Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded bytes still reach userspace.

The sibling subcmd path in joycon ctlr handle event() already bounds the same cast correctly:

if (size < sizeof(struct joycon input report) ||
  data[0] != JC INPUT SUBCMD REPLY)
	break;

Use the same sizeof(struct joycon input report) bound here.