CVE-2026-80796

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfc: nci: add data len bound checks to activation parameter extractors

nci extract activation params iso dep() and nci extract activation params nfc dep() read an inner length byte from the NCI RF INTF ACTIVATED NTF payload and use it to memcpy() into fixed kernel buffers, but neither function receives the caller-validated activation params len. A crafted NCI notification with activation params len=1 and an inner length byte of up to 20 (NFC-A) or 50 (NFC-B) causes memcpy() to read that many bytes past the one valid byte in the activation params region -- a slab out-of-bounds read of kernel memory adjacent to the NCI skb.

The sibling nci extract rf params *() family was given equivalent protection by commit 571dcbeb8e63 ("net: nfc: nci: Fix parameter validation for packet data"), but the two activation parameter extractors were not updated at that time.

Add a data len parameter to both functions, guard against an empty region before consuming the inner length byte, decrement the remaining count after consuming it, and clamp the copy length to what is actually available. Update both call sites to pass ntf.activation params len, which is already validated against the skb at ntf.c:801.