PT-2026-88993 · Videolan · Vlc Media Player

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CVE-2026-56711

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Published

2026-09-09

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Updated

2026-09-11

CVSS v3.1

8.8

High

VectorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
VLC media player computes the size of a picture buffer with 32-bit arithmetic and allocates from the wrapped result. In AllocatePicture in src/misc/picture.c the running total is accumulated as i bytes += p->i pitch * p->i lines, and both plane t fields are declared int in include/vlc picture.h, so the multiplication is evaluated at 32 bits and wraps before it is widened to the size t accumulator. The overflow check that precedes it divides in 64-bit arithmetic and therefore does not constrain the product, and the subsequent comparison against PICTURE SW SIZE MAX examines the already wrapped value, so both guards pass. aligned alloc then reserves the small wrapped size while the decoder writes scanlines sized from the original dimensions. A crafted PNG whose IHDR declares large width and height reaches this path through the image demuxer, whose only size guard is on the input file's byte count rather than the declared dimensions, and the decoder in modules/codec/png.c writes past the end of the allocation with attacker-influenced length and content. Opening the file directly or through a playlist entry is sufficient, with no non-default settings.

Fix

Integer Overflow

Memory Corruption

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Weakness Enumeration

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-56711

Affected Products

Vlc Media Player