Path Equivalence vulnerability in Erlang/OTP inets httpd allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to read files inside a mod auth protected directory by prefixing the request path with an extra slash.

httpd request:validate uri/1 normalises the request URI with uri string:normalize/1, which performs RFC 3986 dot-segment removal but does not collapse empty path segments, so a doubled slash survives. mod alias:real name/3 concatenates the document root with that URI, and mod auth:secret path/3 then decides whether the result lies inside a protected directory block by running the configured directory path as an unanchored regular expression against it. The doubled slash breaks the contiguous substring the regex needs, so the request is treated as unprotected and no authentication challenge is issued, while mod get opens the same path and the operating system collapses the doubled slash and returns the protected file. The same path mismatch also evades the per-path accounting in mod security.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, from 9.4 before 9.6.2.3, and from 9.7 before 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.