PT-2026-90273 · Linux · Linux
CVE-2026-89557
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Published
2026-09-11
·
Updated
2026-09-11
None
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: do overflow check for sb->bblog shift in super 1 load()
In super 1 load(), sb->bblog shift is an u8 type value loaded from on-
disk superblock. It is used for badblocks API badblocks set() by the
following sequence,
1930 rdev->badblocks.shift = sb->bblog shift;
1931 for (i = 0 ; i < (sectors << (9-3)) ; i++, bbp++) {
1932 u64 bb = le64 to cpu(*bbp);
1933 int count = bb & (0x3ff);
1934 u64 sector = bb >> 10;
1935 sector <<= sb->bblog shift;
1936 count <<= sb->bblog shift;
1937 if (bb + 1 == 0)
1938 break;
1939 if (!badblocks set(&rdev->badblocks, sector, count, 1))
1940 return -EINVAL;
1941 }
bb->bblog shit is in range of 0-255, variable sector is 64bit width, for
an invalid bb->bblog shit, it is possible to make sector be overflowed
by the following calculation,
1935 sector <<= sb->bblog shift;
Then in turn when call badblocks set() at line 1939 with the invalid
rdev->badblocks.shift set at line 1930, may result an overflow inside
badblocks clear() in block/badblocks.c.
Although there are many places to call badblocks APIs, the non-zero
shift value is only used in super 1 load(), other places always use 0 as
the shift value. Therefore it is unnecessary to do a general shift value
overflow check inside badblock API, and just check here as the caller.
This may avoid unnecessary check, make the badblocks API code more simple
and elegant.
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Linux