CVE-2026-89634

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink data() error context loop

The check added by commit 7d9a7f1f96cd ("smb/client: fix possible infinite loop and oob read in symlink data()") compared the post-ALIGN length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow: for ErrorDataLength near UINT32 MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8) wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop advances by zero bytes leaving 'p' pointing into stale data.

Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space before applying ALIGN(), then checking again after. Since raw len is bounded by the buffer, raw len + 7 cannot overflow, so the second check is an exact post-alignment bounds guard.