CVE-2026-89760

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm, swap: don't free a hibernation slot that is in the swap cache

A slot with a folio in the swap cache is freed when the folio leaves the cache, not when its count drops. swap put entries cluster() follows that rule. swap free hibernation slot() does not, it calls swap cluster free entries() whether or not a folio sits on the slot.

Cluster readahead can put one there. It walks a raw page cluster sized window of offsets around the faulting entry, and a hibernation slot passes swap cache add check() because it is not a folio and its count is not zero. Freeing the slot then clears the entry under that folio.

The folio is now unreachable from the swap table, and the offset goes back to the allocator. The folio is still on the LRU though, so reclaim can pick it up later. It then takes the old offset out of folio->swap and overwrites the table entry there, which by then may belong to someone else.

This bug can trigger silent memory corruption, process crashes, or data instability across completely unrelated userspace applications - typically occurring when uswsusp is preparing the hibernation image.

I found this while working on giving hibernation slots their own marker in the swap table, which I had discussed with Kairui. (https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/abp7aDgYLrxF3Me8@KASONG-MC4/) As far as I know there are no reports, so there is no Reported-by/Closes to add.

Check for a cached folio before freeing. The slot is then left in the ordinary state where only the swap cache holds it, and it is freed when the folio leaves the cache, either through the reclaim below or through normal reclaim later.