PT-2026-90478 · Linux · Linux
CVE-2026-89762
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Published
2026-09-11
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Updated
2026-09-11
None
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin current label crit section()
AppArmor's begin current label crit section() is a scary function called
from lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checks
if the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG STALE, and if
so, attempts to use aa replace current label() to replace the creds with an
updated version that uses a new label.
The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF of
struct cred if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the current
creds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replaces
creds, like so:const struct cred *cred = current cred();
alloc file pseudo(...);
uid t uid = cred->euid;I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think it
is very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.
The second problem is that things go wrong when aa replace current label()
runs with overridden credentials. aa replace current label() bails out if
current cred() != current real cred() (mirroring the check in
proc pid attr write()), but this check can't actually reliably detect
overridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as the
objective creds.So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:
- task begins with (as both objective and subjective creds), with refcount=2
- task grabs an extra reference on for overriding
- task calls override creds(), which returns a pointer to the old subjective creds ()
- task enters AppArmor LSM hook
- AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal
- AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with and drops 2 refs on
- task leaves AppArmor LSM hook
- task calls revert creds()
- now task->cred is while task->real cred is , but the task struct logically holds two references to
- another task drops the extra reference on that was used for overriding, refcount drops to 0
- now task->real cred points to freed creds
At this point, any access to current cred() will be UAF.
I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a process
using that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file into
a full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()
resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscall
results in a KASAN UAF splat.
To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task work that
will run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which the
cred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just a
performance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount of
the new label.)
Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in the
sb pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacements
can still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc pid attr write().
There are two options for what to do with aa dup task ctx(): Either
explicitly reset new->label replacement pending after the entire
aa task ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.
I am switching to manually copying members over because that should make
bugs more obvious.
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Linux