PT-2026-94296 · Unknown · Ashauthentication
CVSS v4.0
1.8
Low
| Vector | AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X |
Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions
ash authentication versions 4.12.0 through 4.14.x
ash authentication versions 5.0.0-rc.0 through 5.0.0-rc.13
Description
AshAuthentication contains an issue where readers of the audit store can recover client IP addresses that the audit log add-on's
:hash privacy mode is intended to pseudonymise. The function hash ip/1 computes an unkeyed :crypto.hash(:sha256, salt <> ip) and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is retrieved from the :audit log ip salt or :secret application config keys; however, it defaults to a constant string "default-salt-change-in-production" if neither is set, without providing a warning. Because the IPv4 address space is limited to 2^32 values and SHA-256 is computationally efficient, the hash table can be precomputed, allowing stored values to be mapped back to their original source addresses. This risk persists even with a configured salt if the salt is leaked, as the hash remains cheap to enumerate.Recommendations
Update ash authentication to version 4.15.0 or later.
Update ash authentication to version 5.0.0-rc.14 or later.
As a temporary mitigation, avoid setting the
ip privacy mode to :hash in the audit log add-on configuration, using :none, :truncate, or :exclude instead.Exploit
Fix
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Ashauthentication